Hamas's strategy worked. In return for symbolic concessions to Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas - and due mostly to its employment of force against Israel and the Israel Defense Forces' failure to put an end to the launching of Qassam rockets - Hamas is reaping a major achievement. And anyone who is wondering whether the cease-fire will enable Hamas to become stronger should remember that following the group's electoral victory, Israel decided that it would not allow Hamas to consolidate its power unless it met a number of conditions. These conditions have not been met.

The positive aspect of the cease-fire, for both sides, is the fact that Abbas, who seeks to resume diplomatic negotiations, succeeded in arranging it. However, Abbas is also trying to remove the economic boycott of the Gaza Strip and gain international recognition for a Palestinian government in which Hamas will be a leading partner. This can be viewed as a victory for Abbas, but it is clearly also a victory for Hamas.

Hamas's concessions will be symbolic: replacing the prime minister, and appointing a foreign minister affiliated with the organization, but who has a moderate worldview. Hamas showed no flexibility over the conditions presented to it by the international community (recognizing Israel, relinquishing violence and accepting previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements). Abbas will conduct the negotiations with Israel, and Hamas will run the PA. Its control will be looser, assuming that it gives up control of the Interior Ministry and the security services. Nonetheless, if various countries now rush to recognize Hamas, its victory will be complete - and Israel's failure will be great.

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What is particularly worrying is that Hamas succeeded in securing calm in order to better entrench itself. This success was achieved through violence that Israel did not ma nage to prevent - the abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit and the intensification of Qassam rocket attacks against Sderot. Israel did not stop the rocket launches, and the public pressure on Ehud Olmert's government grew.

Calm is good for both sides, Israelis and Palestinians, but it reduces the pressure on Hamas, which was in a difficult situation, at a critical juncture. The fact that Khaled Meshal, who heads Hamas's political bureau, agreed to the deal, and that Tehran and Damascus have been silent about it, suggests that they view it as a Hamas success.

Abbas appreciates the dangers, and has brought forces into northern Gaza to prevent the launching of rockets. The sporadic rocket fire that still continues is being carried out by small Palestinian factions with rockets that they received in the past from Hamas weapons manufactories and the Fatah-linked Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. If Abbas manages to end the rocket attacks, this will be an achievement for him. A more difficult task is putting an end to the arms smuggling across the Gaza-Egypt border, and that depends on Egypt. But on this issue, Hamas can also be calm: It has amassed sufficient quantities of weapons and ammunition that it can allow itself a break from the smuggling