It has been nearly 40 years since former U.S. president Lyndon Johnson convened the skulk of veteran foxes for the fateful consultation on November 2, 1967, on the issue of the Vietnam War. They were called the band of "wise old men," at the White House, and Johnson told them that he believed in their advice as "patriots."

"We certainly shouldn't get out of Vietnam," said Dean Acheson - the secretary of state in Harry Truman's administration - to the president and most of the skulk agreed. Johnson was happy to receive the advice, because that is what he wanted to hear. The war dragged on for many more years before it ended in a hasty retreat.

And so President George W. Bush has not invented the institution of veteran advisors, the role that is being diligently filled now by the Baker-Hamilton commission. The circumstances are different, as are the personnel and the work method, but the danger hovering over the committee that will soon submit its recommendations concerning the strategy needed in Iraq is similar. In a time of war, the leadership needs to react to a changing reality in crisis conditions. Yesterday's discussions rapidly become obsolete.

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In any case, the ring binders that will take in the fruit of the Baker-Hamilton commission's findings will also sow inevitable disappointment: Working papers aren't what it takes to win in the battlefield. Former secretary of state James Baker, influential former legislator; legislator Lee Hamilton and all the rest of this commission's members this week began the closed discussions on the formulation of their recommendations to the president.

The secrecy that envelops them only magnifies the expectations to nearly grotesque dimensions. In any case, the commission will provide an excuse or pose an obstacle to the president - in accordance with his choice or their choice. If they want to change his tack - the commission will be able to provide him with an umbrella. If the commission decides to make recommendations that are contrary to his position, he will squirm in an attempt to justify why he did not act according to its advice.

But this is not a reasonable fear: Sources who know the members of the commission are of the impression that they will try to bring some benefit. This is to say - it is already possible to read their recommendations, at least by implication, which tilt toward the directions in which the administration is now aiming: A desire for a withdrawal, but not right away, an attempt to persuade the countries of the region to help, and a call for dialogue with sworn foes which could be beneficial.

This is the new fashion in Washington, asserted Rob Malley, one of the Clinton administration people, at a conference yesterday on relations between the United States and Syria at the U.S. Institute of Peace - the institution that is hosting the Baker-Hamilton commission. After six years during which the administration has focused on the "isolation" of its foes, the new key word is "engagement".

The question is how much engagement is needed and where. Malley believes that the United States should conduct a dialogue with Syria, but the public hints the heads of the administration have been sending to the committee in recent days are quite clear: The United States does not see the Syrian regime as a worthy interlocutor. Baker and Hamilton would do well to stay away from this track, which looks like a dead end.

Thus, even those who are hoping for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the figure of Baker, the father of the Madrid conference and the "comprehensive solution," can expect disappointment. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley explained on Tuesday that he does not identify any strong connection between solving the Israeli-Arab conflict and the situation in Iraq. Bush committed himself on Tuesday, again: "I'm not going to pull our troops off the battlefield before the mission is complete" - a commitment that the members of the committee are also hearing and one they will have to take into account if they want to preserve their relevance.

In a conversation with Johnson in 1967, Acheson reminisced about the difficult moments of the Korean War and quoted what he said at that time to two of his aides who complained about the discouragement that had spread through the army with regard to the war: "We need less goddamn analysis and more fighting spirit."