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Amos Harel (left) and Avi Issacharoff (right) Last update - 15:58 23/05/2008 ROSNER'S GUESTS: Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff By Shmuel Rosner Tags: Amos Harel  Amos Harel is one of Israel's leading media experts on military and defense issues and has been the military correspondent for Haaretz for the last ten years. Harel also served as anchorman for a weekly radio program on defense issues for Israel's Army Radio Radio, from 1999-2005. Avi Issacharoff is currently Haaretz's correspondent on Palestinian affairs. Since 2002, he has directed and edited short documentary films on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From 2003 -2006 he served as correspondent on Middle Eastern issues for Israel Radio. Harel and Issacharoff co-wrote The Seventh War: How we won and why we lost the war with the Palestinians, a book about the second Intifada, published in 2004 (a revised edition was published in 2005). The book was a best-seller in Israel and has been translated to French and Arabic. It won the prestigious Chechic award (given by Tel Aviv University's institute for strategic studies) for most outstanding security research in 2005. Advertisement Harel and Issacharoff's second book, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon, about the war in summer 2006 was published in Hebrew in January 2008, becoming an instant best-seller. It was released in English last month by Palgrave-Macmillan Books, last month. We will discuss the Lebanon war - the topic of their new book - and other strategic matters. Readers can send questions to rosnersdomain@haaretz.co.il. Dear Amos and Avi, One of the questions you try to answer in your book is this: What can Western countries learn from the IDF's failure against a fundamentalist Islamic terror organization? What's the short answer? Best Rosner Dear Shmuel, By now, we presume most of the lessons gained by Israel, while fighting in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories are well known to Western colleagues. The US is facing some similar challenges in Iraq for the last five years. American and European officers have visited Israel many times in the last 20 months, trying to learn from the IDF's mistakes. Here are a few of the major issues discussed: 1. The limits of containment: Israel has stuck to a policy of containment along its' northern border between 2000 and 2006, for various reasons. The most important one was the Palestinian Intifada, which started in September 2000, five months after the IDF's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. While trying to prevent hundreds of suicide bombers from reaching Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the Hezbollah rockets seem less of an urgent task to deal with. Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister during most of this difficult period, was the only Israeli leader who could not afford, politically, a new invasion in Lebanon. They say that voters' memories are short, but not that short. The Israeli public wouldn't have let Sharon get us entangled in Lebanon again, after the 1982 fiasco (which almost cost Sharon himself his political career). But there is also a price to pay for containment. In regard to Hezbollah's threat, Israel suffered from a syndrome of denial. Hezbollah provocations were ignored, military plans aborted. As a result, Hezbollah - which had only one military enemy to get ready for, began the war with Israel extremely confident and well prepared. It wasn't enough, of course, to beat Israel, but since the IDF has chosen such a botched plan of attack, the results - for us - were disappointing and depressing. 2. The rocket threat. This problem is, in some ways, unique to Israel, since it faces both short range rockets, shot across the border, and potentially long range missiles. The west might face long range missiles (Iran? international Jihadi organizations?) and also terrorist attacks from within, by different methods. But the American population will not be threatened. Probably, by weapons like short range Kassams or Katyushas. As far as long range missiles go, the Israeli airforce has achieved some impressive results (especially by combining intelligence and operations to form a "short cycle" response) which the Americans were quick to study. But the Israeli inaction against the katyushas and the false presumption that airpower would solve the problem are probably some of the worst mistakes of the war. If the US ever faces such a danger (in some ways, the army is dealing with similar threats in Iraq, but the mortar fire isn't aimed at civilian American population) - eventually, there's only non response. After the war an Israeli infantry brigade commander who fought in Lebanon, Colonel Mickey Edelstein, met with American officers from the Marine Corps. Edelstein described his frustrating experience in Lebanon: how he was told to wait, while rockets kept falling in the Galilee. When facing such challenge, one marine told him, "you put your boots on". 3. A "decisive victory" against terror and guerilla warfare? This is perhaps the most debated question by scholars and soldiers alike. Actually, when one looks at Israel's struggle against Palestinian suicide bombers since 2001, it seems as if Israel came very close to achieve this, as close as anybody has managed since the British army in Malya in the late 1950's-early 1960's. But the nature of the fight with Hezbollah was different, of course, a "guerilla army" which was much better trained than Hamas and Fatah, its' main weapons rockets and anti-tank missiles, not "human bombs". Nevertheless, we feel that the outcome of the second war in Lebanon could have been much better. Asymmetrical warfare is a long, exhausting fight. It might go on for a very long time. But with patience, practice, and - most important of all - the right kind of decisions being made at the top - it doesn't have to be a losing battle for the West. Thanks for the questions. We enjoyed the discussion. All the Best, Amos and Avi Dear friends, I don't think we have much choice today: Can Israel and Syria achieve peace? Rosner The short answer: yes. The longer one: ...but not right now. The negotiations with Syria are actually easier to "close" than the Palestinian channel. The basic equation was clear in 1994, Ever since Rabin and Christopher. But this isn't the major question right now. The most important issue, concerning the probability of a peace agreement is: can Olmert deliver? and here - our answer at this moment would have to be: probably not. The reason is the Prime Minister's political situation. What seems to be a very serious case of (alleged) corruption has shattered the remains of Olmert's credibility in the eyes of the Israeli public. Ariel Sharon, we should mention, faced a similar problem in 2004. His disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip seemed tied to the police investigation against him. But Sharon remained very popular. Olmert is both terribly unpopular - and a suspect in a scandal which blew up a short time before the talks between Israel and Syria have been made public. Even if he does reach an agreement with the Syrians, we find it hard to believe that - in the current political situation - the Prime Minister would be able to achieve enough public support to ratify such an agreement, either by elections or a referandum. Does President Assad know all this? we suppose he does. But all Assad did up to now was resume the talks his father had suspended eight years ago. The price for Syria, meanwhile, is not too high. Damascus has already gained Europe's attention (and support) by announcing it is talking to the Israelis again. Assad's position, on the eve of the International Tribunal's session concerning the Hariri assasination, has already improved. If, by some magic set of circumstance, the Bush administration's opinion of Syria changes for the better, Assad will be able to say that he has managed to gain the price of admission. As usual in our part of the world, there's also a down side. Israeli Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, likes to talk of the law of unintended consequences. Barak claims that this law works overtime in the Middle East. Translation: by resuming the talks (a decision Barak himself had suggested to Olmert), both sides are also risking failure - and a worse crisis, even an escaltion that leads to war. We'll just have to wait and see, but one had to wonder yesterday: were it not for Olmert's legal troubles, would we at all hear of the peace negotiations with Syria? Amos and Avi Dear Guests, Do you think Israel is going to enter Gaza (militarily) and if not, how can it prevent the firing of rockets? Thank you, Jeff Barry Never say never in the Middle East, but - at least for the next month or two - it doesn't seem likely that Israel would try a full scale incursion of the Gaza Strip. There are a number of reasons for our assesement. 1. The Egyptian effort to reach a Tha'adyiah (temporary ceasefire) looks like it might succeed. Hamas needs a ceasefire rather urgently, because of the losses suffered by its' military wing and, especially, since it is having a very hard time coping with the economic siege around Gaza. 2. Both the Israeli government and the IDF aren't to keen on an incursion. The generals assume that the army can occupy the strip, but worry about the day after. How would Israel control, again, 1.2 million Palestinians? This could be a mini-Iraq for us, and remember - that was exactly the reason why we withdrew from Gaza in the first place. The army estimates that a full scale operation will cost the lives of dozens of soldiers, not to mention hundreds of civilian casualties - in Gaza, but also Israeli victims of intense rocket attacks. It is also unclear whether Israel has an "exit plan": who will take charge of the strip once the military has finished its' job? 3. The Israeli government, especially in it's current political position (corruption scandals) will have a hard time gaining legitimacy, at home and abroad, for a wide military operation. The international community does not show a real understanding for the price Sderot and other Negev towns and villages are paying because of the rocket attacks. A large part of the Israeli public will not trust Prime Minister Olmert's decisions on this matter (or any matter), while he is facing a police investigation. 4. The situation in the Middle East: Israel and the US are now facing bigger problems, concerning Lebanon and Iran. It's sad to say, but Sderot doesn't seem like top priority right now. Fighting Hamas might also lead to an escalation with Hezbollah and a new war in two different fronts (see also Amos Harel's analysis in Haaretz.com, this morning - May 20th). And then again, all that might change, if the Egyptian initiative fails - and Israel suffers severe civilian casualties in one of the rocket attacks. If this happens, we might see a new incursion, although we suspest that even then, the IDF will try to avoid a huge operation and go for a medium size one. Amos and Avi Dear Mr. Harel and Mr. Isacharoff, Was the failure in Lebanon more a failure of the Israeli military, or was it a failure of the politicians? I know that the chief of staff has resigned, but the Prime Minister is still in power. How can the Israeli public agree to such outcome. Thank you for your interesting comments, Hana Levey, Miami The IDF's ground forces' mediocre preformence (at best) during the war is one of the major reasons why Israel has not achieved what it had expected when the government decided to strike back at Hezbollah. The fact that the army has cut back on training (because of changes in it's budget but mainly because it had to concentrate on fighting Palestinian terror since 2000) had grave results: as it turned out, the ground forces were hardly capable of dealing with a few thousand Hezbollah gunmen in South Lebanon. But if we had to name one reason for Israel's failure during the war, we will have to say: leadership. It was Israel's decision making (by the PM, Defence Minister and also the IDF's chief of staff, Dan Halutz) which led to these disappointing results. These decisions, in short, were: avoiding a ceasefire after the first 48 hours of Israeli retaliation, and again after 96 hours (we feel the actual military response was necessary), sticking to air attacks in the next 3 and a half weeks, although it was already clear by then that this will not stop the katiusha rockets; the delay in calling and training the reserve units; and - perhaps most of all: on August 11, 2006, the futile attempt to start a wide ground operation, when it was plain to see that it's much too late. All these decisions were taken by this fateful triangle at the top of our leadership: Olmert-Peretz-Halutz. All three, by the way, were appointed in the year (in Halutz's case, 13 months) before the war, due to a surprising course of events. We have reason to believe that even if one of the triangle's predecessors (Ariel Sharon, Shaul Mofaz and Moshe Ya'alon, respectively) would have stayed in his original position, things might have turned out a lot different. The previous three at the top, although they had their share of mistakes, were much more exprienced than Olmert and co. when it came to decisions dealing with delicate security issues. We suspect that Sharon. once burnt badly in Lebanon in 1982, would have been more careful than his successor. During the 21 months that had passed since the end of the war, Dan Halutz has resigned and Amir Peretz was forced out of office after losing the Labour primaries to Ehud Barak. As for Ehud Olmert, maybe now the Attorney General will do what the Winograd committee had failed to do. Thanks, Amos and Avi Dear Mr. Rosner, I would like to ask the 2 Haaretz correspondents how is it that they believe Israel has deterrence - when rockets are fired daily from Gaza, and Hezbollah is bold enough to threaten the government of Lebanon and simply ignore the wishes of the international community? n the political Thank you for having a dialogue on such important matter, J. Birenbaum, NY Thank you Mr. Birenbaum for your question. One can not argue with the fact that the Israeli-Lebanese border has never been as quiet as in the last 21 months (since the end of the war). Hezbollah, which faced the Israeli army's attacks during the war, understands now better than anyone else in the region what would be the price it will have to pay, in case of another war with Israel. This seems to be one of the reasons why the Shiite organization recently focused its attention on the political struggle inside Lebanon, rather than resuming the fight against Israel. Unfortunately, there are other interests at work here, namely - Iran's. Former Iranian Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani, once remarked that his country's strategic doctrine is based on defense "from near and from far". The Israeli defense establishment saw this statement as an indication that, in case Iran will be attacked by either the US or Israel (as a preemptive strike against it's nuclear program), Tehran will respond by ordering Hezbollah and Hamas to shoot thousands of rockets at Israel. If and when such escalation occurs, deterrence might not be such an issue anymore. Iran would be fighting for it's life - and probably use any means available. As for the Palestinian threat, the problem is that in many ways, Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations believed Hezbollah's propaganda, which claimed: "we won. Israel lost". More than that, Hamas continues in the shooting of rockets, because it understood from the war in Lebanon that the internal front in Israel is the state's Achilles heel. To summarize: in regard to Hezbollah, Israeli deterrence works, at least for now. When dealing with other terrorist organizations, not as much. Amos and Avi Dear Amos and Avi, I'll start with a simple question, to let the readers have some sense of the things you have in your book: Was the second Lebanon war a failure - and why? Best Shmuel Hi, From an Israeli point of view, this might not be the best time to ask such a question. After all, this month's events in Beirut prove that Hezbollah is actually as strong as it ever was, at least when one looks at the Lebanese political arena. Israelis wanted to believe, for a long time, that the IDF had dealt Hezbollah a severe blow during the second war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. It turns out that Hezbollah may have paid a price, but that its recovery was very quick - and also that the war's effect on Lebanese politics wasn't as enormous as it was presumed to be in Jerusalem. A Hezbollah which does not hesitate to use violence against rival sects in Lebanon has not been defeated in the war, contrary to assessments made by some of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's advisers at the end of the battles. Olmert's office had tried to portray the United Nations' Security Council resolution 1701, which led to the ceasefire in August 14, 2006, as a major achievement. This was also meant to justify the Prime Minister's decision to send the IDF forward, in a last-ditch attempt to gain something, anything, on the ground, a few hours before the vote at the UN. The government has tried in vain to show that the military pressure tilted the resolution in Israel's favor at the last moment. But almost two years later, the resolution remains a questionable document, parts of which have never been implemented and others which have gradually eroded under Hizbollah's pressure. Here are some of the main issues concerning 1701 and the outcome of the war: Hezbollah and the Israeli border: Some improvements were made here. Since the war, Hezbollah no longer maintains visible military outposts close to the border. The Shi'ite fighters had used these outposts as bases from which they launched attacks on IDF forces across the border. One such attack, on July 12, 2006, led to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers and eventually, the war. On the other hand, Hezbollah men are still moving around southern Lebanon, although not as easily and with less confidence than before. The weapons: On this issue, the UN has failed miserably. The resolution talks of a weapons embargo, which never happened. The Syrian-Lebanese border remains open to weapons smugglers. Defense Minister Ehud Barak recently estimated that Hrzbollah now has 40,000 rockets in Lebanon - three times the number it had before the war. Moreover, some of these rockets can now reach the town of Dimona, in southern Israel - a lot further than what the organization could achieve previously. Deterrence: We see this as the major question - and here Olmert has a point. Proof: Ever since the war, Hezbollah has been very careful not to provoke Israel. The border is as quiet as it ever was. Hassan Nasarallah, leader of Hezbollah, has acknowledged in the past that had he known there was even the slightest chance that Israel would react with so much force to the abduction of Israeli soldiers, he would have called off the operation. Further proof: Syrian President Bashar Assad's decision not to strike at Israel after the Israeli air force had bombed the nuclear plant in northeast Syria on September 6, 2007. After the war, Assad seemed very confident, and threatened to take back the Golan Heights by force. But Assad chose not to retaliate last September, and we suspect he acted this way because he knew the truth - that although the IDF's ground forces fought rather poorly in Lebanon, Israel's air force and military intelligence are a different matter. An army that can destroy most of Hezbollah's medium-range missiles in one stroke, that doesn't hesitate to demolish Hezbollah's headquarters at the Dahia in Beirut (not to mention the attack on the nuclear plant), is still a formidable enemy one should not challenge unless there is a very good reason to do such a thing. Thanks, Looking forward to more questions, Amos and Avi Bookmark to del.icio.us   Say what you want French court: Claim that Al-Dura tape doctored isn`t libelous. Peace in our time Olmert: Peace talks with Syria are a 'national duty'.   1.   And Our Thanks to...... 20:30  |  MiddleStanian 18/05/08   2.   I think you mean "airforce" 20:38  |  Clickfool 18/05/08   3.   Read New York Times Article 21:43  |  Reid 18/05/08   4.   What value war? 23:01  |  a wandering Jew 18/05/08   5.   Correction to No.4 00:39  |  a wandering Jew 19/05/08   6.   To "clickfool" 01:16  |  Hansje 19/05/08   7.   Israel Should Use Tactical Nukes..Click Fool 04:23  |  Dave Levy 19/05/08   8.   4 Wandering Jew - Absolutely Not 07:38  |  Mark of Lewiston 19/05/08   9.   N0 8 Mark of Lewiston 14:59  |  a wandering Jew 19/05/08   10.   Blow them up 01:46  |  Stranger 20/05/08   11.   9 Wandering Jew 05:43  |  Mark of Lewiston 20/05/08   12.   The real implication of all this 21:08  |  Shalom Freedman 20/05/08   13.   Hezbollah Much Stronger 21:23  |  gearoid 20/05/08   14.   WITH SUCH EXPERTS ........ 22:36  |  JACKAL 20/05/08   15.   Amos and Avi are wrong! 12:10  |  Dutch Dirk 21/05/08   16.   Where is My Question 15:26  |  Mark of Lewiston 21/05/08   17.   Point 2 About Gaza Invasion 21:25  |  Mark of Lewiston 21/05/08

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